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Chapter One: Introduction 
Loss is a universal, human phenomenon that is integral to an understanding of psychological 
development and experience. Indeed, Krell (2000: 2) suggests that most thinkers would affirm 
that “there is nothing more human than mourning, or the capacity to mourn, and that to ignore 
that capacity is to overlook what philosophers love to call the essence of human being”. 
Mourning for a loss is a complex and deeply challenging process and it seems to resist 
circumscription or the assignation of any ultimate and final meaning. Krell (2000: 4) rather 
astutely questions whether mourning is an emotion or a process, an affect or an event, a fatality 
or an achievement; he intimates that while mourning involves a combination of affects, it seems 
somewhat different from regret, sorrow or sadness. The experience of having lost someone so 
completely “defies telling and incites the labours of mourning” (5), so that, as Spargo (2004: 6) 
proposes, one of the functions of mourning is a “belated protection of the dead, and therefore this 
retrospective effort always pertains to a question about the place the other still holds in the 
world”. While the question of mourning seems to resist resolution and clear understanding, its 
experience as an event or an affective process of working through brings to the fore in an intense 
and urgent way the fact that everything from now on “will come to be reflected quivering, 
reflecting disappearance itself” (Derrida, 2001: 107).   
In recent years, and circumstantially prompted by the death of Jacques Derrida in 2004, several 
scholars working on his considerable oeuvre (Gaston, 2006; Davis, 2007; Royle, 2009; and 
Bennington, 2010) identified the question of mourning as a profound ethical concern in his 
writings because it alludes to the complex relationship to otherness within the self, as well as to 
other persons. The impetus for singling out the theme of mourning is located in the active 
struggle that these scholars continue to face in responding to the significance of Derrida‟s legacy. 
This struggle encourages a number of questions that are not necessarily accompanied by any 
easy answers: How does one mourn? What is mourning? When does it begin? To whom does it 
belong? How does one survive mourning? The process of mourning, as a response to loss, seems 
to capture in all its complexity the ethical challenge and necessity of responding to, whilst 
resisting any complete appropriation of, the other. Mourning is a process which profoundly 
affects our capacity to know and understand what is at stake in the loss of a significant other. It is 
as if the process of mourning takes on a secret life that is not readily available to the conscious 
mind.  
The gradual movement towards the topic of mourning finds its inspiration in the late work of 
Derrida when he enters into a number of exchanges with Hélène Cixous; they explore their 
friendship, their philosophies and their experience of each other‟s work and life1. This research 
project has selected texts which highlight Derrida‟s and Cixous‟ concern with experience of loss 
and survival. The theme of loss is scattered throughout the body of writings by both Derrida and 
Cixous; this project aims to extract and explicate relevant excerpts from various monographs and 
essays that deal specifically and explicitly with this theme in order to provide a more substantial 
and coherent version of such complex approaches to loss. This endeavour will give significance 
to the project, because very little work has previously been done on collating and integrating 
such material from these two writers
2
. It should be emphasized, however, that this project is 
exploratory in the sense that it will map and interpret an intellectual field (French 
poststructuralist approaches to loss) without seeking to arrive at definitive answers or 
conclusions. 
Davis (2007: 131) suggests that the terms mourning and melancholia have been almost 
inevitably linked to each another since the publication of Freud‟s important metapsychological 
essay in 1917. Indeed in “Mourning and Melancholia”, Freud (1917) explores how mourning and 
melancholia present in a similar way in that both conditions are a response to the loss of 
something significant, whether that be a person or an ideal; this in turn leads to cessation of 
interest in the outside world, an inability to love and the inhibition of activity and performance. 
Mourning, however, can be brought to a gradual end after a certain lapse of time. It begins to 
lose its traumatic force as the grieving subject disinvests from the deceased person or lost ideal 
and makes space for the ego to reinvest in new objects. Melancholia, on the other hand, occurs 
                                                          
1
 The textual dialogue between Derrida and Cixous is documented in six monographs. Derrida published two texts: 
Geneses, Genealogies, Genres and Genius: The Secrets of the Archive (2006c) and H.C. for Life, That is to Say… 
(2006). Cixous has published four texts so far: Portrait of Derrida as a Young Jewish Saint (2004); Dream I Tell 
You (2006); Insister of Jacques Derrida (2007) and Hyperdream (2009). 
2 The primary texts for Derrida are: Memoires for Paul de Man (1989); The Work of Mourning (2001); and Learning 
to Live Finally: The Last Interview (2007). The primary texts for Cixous are: Hyperdream (2009); and selected 
essays, vignettes and interviews from Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing (1993), Rootprints (1997), Stigmata 
(1998) and White Ink (2008). 
 
when the process of grieving and disinvestment is obstructed. Affect remains attached to the lost 
object, yet the subject “cannot consciously grasp what he has lost” (312). The melancholic 
subject may know who it is that s/he has lost but not what it is about this significant other that 
s/he has lost. Consequently, as Butler (2004) points out, the lost, beloved object continues to 
haunt and inhabit the melancholic ego and is made co-extensive with it. Melancholic 
identification attempts to avert complete loss by preserving (incorporating) the lost object as part 
of the ego; it is this internalization that forms part of the mechanism by which the melancholic 
subject refuses to abandon the lost object. Incorporation disavows or postpones the recognition 
of suffering for a loss. Melancholia as a psychic economy is, therefore, both the refusal of grief 
and the incorporation of loss
3
.  
Davis (2007: 132) proposes that it is fair to assume that Freud‟s account of mourning and 
melancholia “is at least to some extent lurking in the background” (131) of Derrida‟s 
understanding of mourning for a loss. This notion is reiterated by Miller (2009: 309) who 
suggests that Derrida‟s account of mourning frequently involves an implicit reference to Freud‟s 
influential essay. However, as Davis (2007: 132) continues, “it would clearly be a mistake simply 
to apply Freud‟s account of melancholia to Derrida‟s melancholic subject”. Both scholars are 
aware of the very tenuous, and potentially reductive, links that one could make between Derrida 
and Freud. While citing the allusion to Freud, they prefer to treat Derrida‟s ideas on interminable 
mourning as separate and independent from Freud‟s so as not to risk either pathologising 
Derrida‟s treatment of the subject matter, or using Freud‟s ideas as an index or measure against 
which Derrida‟s version is assessed. This research project concurs with Davis‟s notion that 
Freud‟s account of mourning and melancholia cannot simply - without considerable qualification 
and modification - be applied to Derrida‟s reading of such processes. While Derrida may draw 
inspiration from, or play off, Freud‟s essay, he offers a complex response that diverges 
considerably from Freud‟s ideas. Moreover, it is not an explicit aim of this project to make direct 
links between Freud‟s and Derrida‟s accounts of complicated mourning as a condition of 
melancholia, thus exploring similarities and differences. Instead this study will use Freud‟s 
important essay as a guide or broad mapping of a psychological terrain, which will facilitate the 
                                                          
3
 For an interesting account of incorporation (and its supposed opposite, introjection), the reader is referred to 
Derrida‟s (1986: xvi) essay, “Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok”, where he examines  
what is “played out on the borderline that divides and opposes the two terms”.   
unfolding and explication of Derrida‟s philosophical musings on the problematics of mourning 
for a loss. In the next chapter on Derrida‟s account, however, there will be a brief consideration 
of the ways in which he broadly reworks Freud‟s distinction between mourning and melancholia. 
While it is possible to offer some comparison between Freud and Derrida on mourning and loss, 
it does not seem possible to do so between Freud and Cixous. Cixous writes in her own unique 
and poetic way, so that any possible identification with, or reference to, Freud seems oblique, or 
at the very least, deeply repressed. There are, however, illuminating parallels to be drawn 
between Derrida and Cixous; these will discussed in the conclusion. It should be emphasised that 
this enquiry carries no expectation of arriving at clear-cut resolutions or distinctions, such as neat 
definitions of, and final pronouncements on, normative ways of responding to the loss of a 
significant other. Instead, as already noted, it is an exploratory study that attempts to carve out 
possible ways of theorising the terrain or domain of loss.   
At stake in a consideration of mourning is the movement of getting over, or recovering from, the 
loss of a significant other. But one needs to investigate what happens if it is not possible to lose 
this loss. Derrida and Cixous each have a unique approach to considering the complex and 
challenging patterns of response that emerge in the face of such loss, or as a consequence of such 
loss. Chapter 2 will explore Derrida‟s contribution to the interminable process of mourning. For 
Derrida, reckoning with the dead is extremely demanding and we risk consuming or colonising 
the other by attempting to internalise the other within the self. Moreover, our encounter with the 
other also alludes to experiences that may not necessarily be readily available to our conscious 
minds. Derrida focuses on how best to honour this unique and intricate engagement with the 
dead other. Indeed, he is interested in the scope of our responsibility to the other and how we can 
create renewed exchange even though the other is now dead. Derrida sides more closely with 
what in Freudian terms would be regarded as a „melancholic‟ position, one that protests against 
mourning which attempts to return the subject to a normal state of functioning as before the loss. 
In his version of melancholia, the subject is responsible for carrying the other, for keeping the 
other within the self alive, and for actively engaging with the questions of life, death and the 
vicissitudes of existence.  
Chapter 3 explores Cixous‟ approach to understanding and experiencing loss. She suggests that 
we are never quite prepared for the moment of the death of a loved one. In fact, we frequently  
„die‟ the death of a significant other out of fear. Cixous is interested in finding ways to reclaim 
(for life) what we have lost in the death of another. She views the other‟s death as an opportunity 
for us to live life more productively and vitally; the loss of a loved one gives occasion to start 
thinking more creatively about our existence. With the aid of writing and dreaming, we can pass 
over to the (other) side of life which affirms surviving and living in the aftermath of death. 
Cixous proposes that writing and dreaming take us further than we thought it possible to go. In 
short, writing and dreaming hold out the hope that we may begin to confront death from within 
life, which in turn affirms the immensely creative work of living.  
The Conclusion will attempt to sum up the key, exploratory findings of the previous two 
chapters. While it falls beyond the scope of this necessarily circumscribed enquiry to explore the 
life-death debate that Derrida and Cixous raise in their own writings and in their textual 
exchanges with each other, the closing paragraphs will nevertheless offer the reader a taste of 
this exchange, since the themes of mourning and loss encourage a questioning of, or grappling 














Chapter Two: The Interminable Mourning of Jacques Derrida 
In his text, The Work of Mourning, Derrida engages with the theme of loss in response to the 
deaths of some of his close colleagues and contemporaries, such as Roland Barthes, Michel 
Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Jean-François Lyotard. He addresses the question of loss by 
placing himself “amidst his own ghosts” as he quotes from characteristic writings and calls on a 
“growing throng of dead colleagues and friends” to enter into an exchange with him, to 
“maintain a dialogue, knowing that they cannot” (Davis, 2007: 128). Derrida opens himself up to 
the dead other through letters of condolence, memorial essays, eulogies and funeral orations. The 
aim of this chapter is to extract relevant passages from these various forms or genres of 
narration, which provide insights into, or shed light on, Derrida‟s philosophy of loss (which is 
also a philosophy of life and death) in order to develop a more comprehensive theoretical 
understanding of his approach to this subject. It will also offer a brief exposition of Derrida‟s 
reworking of Freud‟s ideas on mourning and melancholia, revealing the ways in which Derrida 
diverges from Freud‟s understanding.  
For Derrida, mourning is not a process delimited in time, but is rather interminable. It is difficult 
to resolve because the process of mourning is not inaugurated by the death of a significant other.  
Instead, it has already begun before the death of the other and it is never to be ended. Moreover, 
the fact of one‟s own mortality is foreshadowed in the multiple losses occasioned by others, even 
if it is placed in temporary abeyance (Davis, 2007: 129). Brault and Naas (2001: 2) point out that 
Derrida is deeply interested in what it means to reckon with death and with the dead, “with all 
those who were once close to us but who are no longer, as we say, „with us‟ or who are „with us‟ 
only insofar as they are „in us‟”. For Derrida (1989: xvi), the death of a significant other may be 
unthinkable or unspeakable, but we are nonetheless called upon to break the silence and 
participate in the rites of mourning: “Speaking is impossible, but so too would be silence or 
absence or a refusal to share one‟s sadness”. Yet mourning risks the danger of narcissistic 
appropriation of the other, especially since the dead other can no longer respond to us. It seems 
as though we face a “paralysing double-bind” in which, as Royle (2009: 70) suggests, it becomes 
impossible to speak yet impossible not to speak.  
Derrida (2001: 34) interrogates the notion of the dead “in” us and problematizes this supposed 
interiority of mourning, since the absolutely other, who once dead is reduced to images for us, 
“resists the closure of our interiorizing memory”. “Each time”, writes Derrida, we need to 
recognise “our friend to be gone forever, irremediably absent...for it would be unfaithful to 
delude oneself into believing that the other living in us is living in himself:  because he lives in us 
and because we live this or that in his memory, in memory of him” (1989: 21)4.  The other might 
be within us but, as Derrida reminds us, “it is not ours; we do not have it available to us like a 
moment or part of our interiority” (44). This seems to suggest, as Brault and Naas (2001) write, 
that a reckoning with the dead can now, from the moment of death, be only in us, the living
5
. 
This intractable reality of the dead who are now only “in us”, who are now only images “for us”, 
however, does not assume that we can take ownership of the images and memories of the other 
for the process of interiorization, however inevitable, is never complete and remains in the end, 
impossible. Moreover, the process of interiorization offers no easy indication of the limits 
between the inside and the outside, between the self and the other. Indeed, while “the veil must 
be torn toward the other”, the “other dead in us” is “other still” (Derrida, 2001: 52), so that 
something of the alterity of the other is preserved even as it is internalized. What we are left with 
are perhaps “memories and monuments” which are reducible to “visible scenes that are no longer 
anything but images” (159). These images speak to the “visibility of the body, a geometry of 
gazes, an orientation of perspectives” which are inevitably interiorized since the dead other can 
no longer be but in us (159). That the other, having disappeared or having passed away, leaves 
„in us‟ only images suggests that the dead are recollected or represented primarily through the 
medium of the visual or the modality of thought and language. However, it should be noted that 
the dead cannot always be represented properly through images and they may ultimately resist 
any medium which attempts to grasp at their memory.     
Derrida is interested in the “possibility of an interiorization of what can never be interiorized” 
(Brault and Naas, 2001: 11); this is also the impossible which “can no longer be interiorized” 
since it resists reappropriation and exceeds and traverses “mournful memory” while 
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 Brault and Naas (2001: 25) remind the reader that the phrase “each time” marks a site of iteration and substitution 
as it punctuates a singular time and place. While we may experience the loss of numerous others during our lifetime, 
it becomes important to respond to the singularity of the significant other, to respond to his or her death uniquely.   
5
 In reckoning with the death of Roland Barthes and the desire to dedicate his thoughts to him, Derrida (2001:35) is 
forced to consider how his thoughts “will no longer reach him, and this must be the starting point of my reflection; 
they can no longer reach him, reach all the way to him, assuming they ever could have while he was still living”. 
Derrida is forced to concede that his friend, Roland Barthes, is no longer there, with him, and that he “must hold fast 
to this evidence, to its excessive clarity, and continually return to it as if to the simplest thing”. 
simultaneously, paradoxically, constituting it (Derrida, 1989: 38). The impossible alludes to the 
paradox of what is taken in by the subject after the death of another, but not necessarily 
registered or absorbed by the subject‟s conscious mind. For Derrida, it is this aspect that is 
somehow central to the process of what we internalise during mourning even though we cannot 
name or understand it.  Indeed, it is the aporia of taking in what cannot be taken in (by the 
conscious mind) that becomes the locus and source of our (ethical) responsibility and the 
“unbearable paradox of fidelity” (Derrida, 2001: 159)6. What is “in us”, properly speaking, is not 
ours, as the images within us might seem to be, so that what is in effect before and beyond us 
becomes the source of our responsibility (Brault and Naas, 2001: 11). There is no symmetry in 
the gaze between the self and the dead other but rather “dissymmetry that can be interiorized 
only by exceeding, fracturing, wounding, injuring, traumatizing the interiority” (Derrida, 2001: 
160). The infinite alterity of the other is already beyond us, at an infinite remove, so that while 
something (images, memories, feelings, qualities) of a significant relationship with another (who 
is now deceased) can be interiorized, the full import or significance of this relationship cannot be 
readily grasped by the conscious mind. As Derrida (1989: 34) puts it: “death constitutes and 
makes manifest the limits of a me or an us who are obliged to harbour something that is greater 
and other than them; something outside of them within them”. In this way, the “possibility of the 
impossible” commands the “whole rhetoric of mourning” (34), so that mourning “would have to 
fail in order to succeed” (Derrida, 2001: 144).  
If it were at all possible to interiorize the other faithfully, then the other would no longer quite 
seem to be other; the other would be appropriated in terms of sameness and the success of 
interiorization would fail. On the other hand, “an aborted interiorization is at the same time a 
respect for the other as other, a sort of tender rejection, a movement of renunciation which leaves 
the other alone, outside, over there, in his death, outside of us” (Derrida, 1989: 35). And it is in 
this latter instance where failure succeeds, that is, where interiorization is interminable and 
ultimately unaccomplished. Mourning is necessary but impossible: it is both necessary and 
impossible so that, as Royle (2009: 135) writes, mourning “fails to happen, it fails in happening, 
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 Deutscher (2005: 72) rightly suggests thar the trope of mourning provides a useful forum for thinking about the 
question of the self‟s relation to the other and questions of identity and difference. The self is never fully 
autonomous and cannot thoroughly take leave of the other, so the notion of „getting over‟ the other “belies the fact 
that we are always in relation with the (dead or alive) other”. Mourning can therefore become a consideration and 
determination of the “most respectful, most grateful, and also most giving way of relating to the other and of relating 
the other to the self” (Derrida, 1995: 281-282).  
it never completely finally happens, except in failing. To the extent that it succeeds in happening, 
mourning fails, it fails to happen”. Royle‟s elucidation is apt and subtle, yet inherently 
paradoxical and complex. It alludes to the aporetic movement at work in Derrida‟s version of 
mourning. Deutscher (2005: 71) offers a clearer exposition of this paradox of fidelity:  
 
For mourning to fully succeed, we should be able to get over the loss of the other in 
question. But if we can get over him or her, something seems to have failed in the 
mourning....From this perspective, a truly appropriate mourning would be a mourning we 
couldn‟t accomplish, that continues until our death. Derrida claims that if mourning 
succeeds, it fails, and it must fail in order to succeed. In this sense, mourning is 
impossible.  
 
In a dialogue with Elizabeth Roudinesco, Derrida (2004: 159-160) considers this impossible 
(failed-therefore-successful) mourning as follows:  
 
Mourning must be impossible. Successful mourning is failed mourning. In successful 
mourning, I incorporate the one who has died, I assimilate him to myself, I reconcile 
myself with death, and consequently I deny death and the alterity of the dead other and of 
death as other. I am therefore unfaithful. Where the introjection of mourning succeeds, 
mourning annuls the other. I take him upon me, and consequently I negate or delimit his 
infinite alterity....Faithfulness prescribes to me at once the necessity and the impossibility 
of mourning. It enjoins me to take the other within me, to make him live in me, to 
idealise him, to internalise him, but it also enjoins me not to succeed in the work of 
mourning: the other must remain the other. He is effectively, presently, undeniably dead, 
but, if I take into me as part of me, and if, consequently, I “narcissise” this death of the 
other by a successful work of mourning, I annihilate the other, I reduce or deny his death” 
[translation slightly modified by Royle (2009), see p. 135].  
 
Elsewhere, Derrida (1995: 152) sums up rather usefully this “terrible logic of mourning”, this 
unbearable paradox: “I cannot complete my mourning for everything I lose, because I want to 
keep it, and at the same time, what I do best is to mourn, is to lose it, because by mourning, I 
keep it inside of me”. For Derrida, this schema of mourning is a “hard and undeniable necessity” 
that renders the possibility of “true mourning impossible” (Derrida, 1989: 35), so that “whoever 
thus works at the work of mourning learns the impossible – and that mourning is interminable. 
Inconsolable. Irreconcilable” (Derrida, 2001: 143). The unbearable paradox of fidelity thus 
suggests that the process of interiorization should not be regarded as complete since, there is “an 
inconsolability or irreparability that no work of mourning shall ever come to mend” (221). Loss 
is perceived as irreducible In short, impossible mourning, as Krell (2000: 17) suggests, is 
mourning which is “eminently unsuccessful”; it is “being unable to be done with one‟s 
mourning” (Royle, 2009: 78).     
 
The work of mourning is the “name of a problem” (Derrida, 2001: 50) and it speaks to the 
difficulty of tolerating the aporia, the “impossible choice between two infidelities” (Brault and 
Naas, 2001: 12). In Memoires for Paul de Man, Derrida (1989: 6) foregrounds the conundrum as 
follows: 
Is the most distressing, or even the most deadly infidelity that of a possible mourning 
which would interiorize within us the image, idol, or ideal of the other who is dead and 
lives only in us? Or is it that of the impossible mourning, which, leaving the other his 
alterity, respecting thus his infinite remove, either refuses to take or is incapable of taking 
the other within oneself, as in the tomb or the vault of some narcissism? 
Derrida is sensitive to the ethical implications of the process of internalising the other who has 
died. He is aware of the risks of „successful‟ mourning which may indicate that the other is 
internalised within the self and the very possibility of alterity is threatened by sameness, by a 
cannibalisation of the otherness of the other. The question of interiority, of the other in the self, 
of the self‟s responsibility to the other who has died, is inextricably tied to the process of 
mourning. Brault and Naas (2001: 22) focus the prevailing uncertainty in the following 
questions: “To whom or what are we responsible in mourning? To the friend, him–or herself? To 
his or her words? His or her memory? What is the best way of remaining faithful?”. Derrida is 
interested in our responsibility to the dead other, and ways of honouring the other through our 
responsibility, so that we are able to engage with the other “without pluralizing the unique or 
generalizing what is most irreplaceable” (Derrida, 2001: 59).  
Derrida (2001: 38) concedes that it is necessary, to some extent, to take the other into the self, to 
identify with the other in order to let him/her speak within oneself, to make the other present and 
faithfully represent him/her. Yet the temptation to take in the other is also extremely dangerous, 
potentially “indecent and most murderous” (38), in that the singularity of the other may be 
threatened or subsumed by the self‟s appropriating powers. For Derrida, the subject in mourning, 
“this being at a loss” (95), has an (impossible) duty to let the other speak, “to turn speech over to 
him, his speech, and especially not to take it from him, not to take it in his place...to allow him to 
speak, to occupy his silence or to take up speech oneself only in order, if this is possible, to give 
it back to him” (95). Moreover, the subject who is mourning becomes responsible for negotiating 
a precarious process which entails a respect for the alterity of the other while managing the 
“most vivid desire”; the “most forbidden desire from now on”, which has been “most cruelly 
battered”, would be a desire to speak, still, to the other, “to hear him and to respond to him...not 
just within ourselves...but to speak to him and to hear him, himself, speaking to us”. For Derrida, 
however, this desire is a desire for the “impossible” and we “can no longer even take the measure 
of this wound” (72). It seems as if, as Brault and Naas (2001: 27) astutely perceive, the “drama is 
not so much that we lose the friend after death but that we can no longer lose them; they who 
were once so distant become all too close, too close because now only within us – in us as a part 
of us and of history and no longer as the singularity that called us out of ourselves and first made 
us responsible before them”.    
What is at stake in loss is “some thing other, an even more singular thing” (Derrida, 2001: 96) 
which endlessly hollows out the “depths of our memories” (95). This something other lies 
“beneath the phenomenal or public scope of our destiny” and behind the “fleeting, inapparent 
moments, those without archive or words” (95). It is associated with the “essence” or singularity 
of an encounter or event that is experienced (as a feeling, sense or fleeting impression perhaps) 
rather than explicitly thought about – “a meeting in a café, a letter eagerly torn open, a burst of 
laughter revealing the teeth, a tone of the voice, an intonation on the phone, a style of 
handwriting in a letter, a parting in a train station” (95). It is a “seal of a secret affirmation” that 
is difficult to circumscribe, limit or name (Derrida, 1989: xvi), a “singular incandescence that no 
volume and no memory can contain” (Brault and Naas, 2001: 30), a “secret language” or “hidden 
intimacy” that is “clandestine, coded, held back, discreetly held in reserve, held in silence” 
(Derrida, 2001: 228). Derrida (2001: 38) longs for the impossible which would appear and 
develop almost photographically before his eyes, as if the “pace, step, style, timbre, tone, and 
gestures” of the other, “so many obscurely familiar signatures...were all of a sudden going to 
yield their secret to me as one more secret hidden behind the others (and I call secret not only 
what is intimate but a certain way of doing things: the inimitable)”. Effectively, Derrida requests, 
impossibly, the “ecstasy of revelation”, “instantaneous access” to the other and the other alone, a 
“free and easy access requiring no labour”. However, while the movement of interiorization 
“keeps within us the life, thought, body, voice, look or soul of the other”, it does so only as 
“lacunary fragments, detached and dispersed”, only as “‟parts‟ of the departed other” (Derrida, 
1989: 37).  
 
The complexity of mourning is linked to the way in which we interiorize experience, the 
memories we have. As Derrida (1989: 6) puts it: “What does it tell us, this impossible mourning, 
about an essence of memory?”. It seems as though experience (and thus memories) cannot 
always be represented by and through images. Indeed some of our experience forms part of what 
the psychoanalyst, Christopher Bollas (1987), terms the “unthought known” - that which is 
„known‟ not so much as an object of representation, but rather as a recurrent experience of being, 
an existential as opposed to a representational knowing; however this cannot necessarily be 
thought about in a conceptually accepted sense. The unthought known is “where knowledge 
unravels from its own self-possession, from its pretension as knowledge” (Rose, 2003: 151), 
functioning as “a force of dissemination that moves us to places beyond thinking” (Bollas, 1992: 
17). It takes into account the “wordless” element in the adult and alludes to existential, as  
opposed to cognitive, memory, which is conveyed not through visual or abstract thinking, but 
through the effects of being. Such moments “feel familiar, uncanny, sacred, reverential, and 
outside cognitive coherence” (Bollas, 1993: 40-41). Moreover, these moments ultimately resist 
memorialisation through images, so that what is internalised (of the other) in and by the self is 
not always easily retrievable from the archive of memories as a “totalizing summary – the 
exhaustive narrative or the total absorption of a memory” (Derrida, 1989: 11). In this way, the 
death of the other on each occasion uniquely brings to a close a world that was „experienced‟ 
between (the) two (of us); a “long, rich, and intense stretch of [the] living self” is interrupted 
(Derrida, 2001: 115).  
Derrida (2001: 95) proposes that, each time uniquely, the loss of an other signals the end of 
“nothing less than an origin of the world, each time the sole world, the unique world” (95). 
Elsewhere, he describes the end of this unique world in the following way: 
For each time, and each time singularly, each time irreplaceably, each time infinitely, 
death is nothing less than an end of the world. Not only one end among others, the end of 
someone or of something in the world, the end of a life or of a living being. Death puts an 
end neither to someone in the world nor to one world among others. Death marks each 
time, each time in defiance of arithmetic, the absolute end of the one and only world, of 
that which each opens as a one and only world, the end of the unique world, the end of 
the totality of what is or can be presented as the origin of the world for any unique living 
being, be it human or not (Derrida, 2005: 140).   
What comes to an end is a world in which the self and the other have “lived a unique story”, an 
irreplaceable story which “will have had one meaning or another for the two of us, even if this 
meaning could not have been the same” (Derrida, 2001: 115). The death of an other marks the 
disappearance of a unique world which from now on “sinks into an abyss from which no 
memory...can save it” (115). As a result, we can only but struggle with words in our attempt and 
desire “to discover and to invent a language capable of sustaining a dialogue with the dead” 
(Davis, 2007: 137), to produce a “discourse of mourning that encapsulates the singular, secretive 
existence” of the beloved deceased (136).  
Derrida (1989: 56) proposes that there is an “eclipse or ellipsis in the movement of 
interiorization” which has less to do with the finite limitations of memory and more to do with 
the “structure of the relation to the other” which makes the “inscription of memory an 
effacement of interiorizing recollection”. Between what is recalled after the death of the other 
and what was experienced during a (unique) life with the other, there is “rupture, heterogeneity, 
disjunction”, so that memory can no longer merely signify a “mental „capacity‟” (56). Instead, 
the finitude of memory is coloured by experiences of “discontinuity and distance” which attest to 
something different from the self, of the difference of the other from the self. The absolute 
singularity of the dead other addresses itself to the self, it “pierces, strikes me, wounds me, 
bruises me”, so that the self can no longer suspend the death of the other, even though “its 
„presence‟ forever escapes me, having already receded into the past” (Derrida, 2001: 39). 
Effectively, the other “comes to me without being directed towards me, without being present to 
me” (39).    
The work of mourning is virtually in process from the very start of a significant relationship; it 
begins long before the “unqualifiable event called death” so that “interiority (of the other in me, 
in you, in us) ha[s] already begun its work” (Derrida, 2001: 46). Mourning “takes its place in 
advance” (146)7. Derrida suggests that we cannot escape this scenario of anticipation, which 
marks any relationship, because there is “mourning that follows death but also [the] mourning 
that is prepared and that we expect from the very beginning to follow upon the death of those we 
love. Love or friendship would be nothing other than the passion, the endurance, and the patience 
of this work” (146). In this way, there is no relationship (except through denial) without “this 
knowledge of finitude”, so that “everything we inscribe in the living present of our relation to 
others already carries, always, the signature of memoirs-from-beyond-the-grave” (Derrida, 1989: 
29). There is an attempt to imagine, before the fact, a world without ourselves or significant 
others, a “world that will have absorbed either absence”. However, when this event finally does 
come, an event which we have perhaps anticipated and prepared for, it still strikes us uniquely – 
each time it feels like the end of the/a world (Brault and Naas, 2001: 15). Death comes to the 
other, and “comes to us through the other” (Derrida, 1989: 28), leaving in its wake “terrible 
solitude” (33) and a contemplation of our mortality. This contemplation of our own inevitable 
death is also, however, an approach to “learn(ing) to live” which is taught “from the other and by 
death”, “from the other at the edge of life” (Derrida, 1994: xvii-xviii). As Derrida (1994: xviii) 
puts it: “To live, by definition, is not something one learns. Not from oneself, it is not learned 
from life, taught by life. Only from the other and by death”. To learn to live, “alone, from 
oneself, by oneself”, is, according to Derrida, “ethics itself”, a certain responsibility, in that it is 
important to come to terms with death – both one‟s own and that of the other (xviii)8.  
                                                          
7
 As Derrida (2002: 132) writes: “Just because the dead no longer exist does not mean that we are done with 
spectres. On the contrary. Mourning and haunting are unleashed at this moment. They are unleashed before death 
itself, out of the mere possibility of death”. For Davis (2007: 158), the subject is “haunted even before it is bereaved; 
its engagement with others already exposes it to the reality of loss”. In this way, and rather interestingly, as Miller 
(2009: 307) suggests, “to live is to be a survivor. It is to be a survivor not so much of the death of others as of one‟s 
own death”. As Derrida (1995: 321-322) writes: “But I can have this experience of „my own death‟ by relating to 
myself only in the impossible experience, the experience of the impossible mourning at the death of the other...In the 
experience of impossible mourning, I anticipate my own death, I relate to myself as mortal”.   
8
 The topic of ethics includes a vast and complex body of ideas, and it falls beyond the scope of this study to explore 
the terrain of the ethical in any detail. For the purposes of this project, the ethical is concerned with the relation that 
For Derrida (2001: 175), “the affirmation of life is nothing other than a certain thought of death; 
it is neither opposition nor indifference to death – indeed one would almost say the opposite if 
this were not giving in to opposition”9. Learning to live is inextricably linked to learning how to 
die, “learning to take into account, so as to accept, absolute mortality (that is, without salvation, 
resurrection, or redemption – neither for oneself nor for the other)” (Derrida, 2007: 24). And 
surviving the dead other is not simply about remaining on after the other, but taking 
responsibility for the “most intense life possible” (52), which would involve an engagement with 
what it means to live in the face of death; rather radically, death becomes a precondition for 
living and it seems almost impossible to consider a life worth living without considering the fact 
of mortality. For Derrida (1994: xvii), learning to live can only happen “between two”, such as 
between life and death, and it can only “maintain itself with some ghost”. Indeed, to learn to live 
is “to learn to live with ghosts, in the upkeep, the conversation, the company, or the 
companionship, in the commerce without commerce of ghosts”. This statement seems to suggest 
that the dead or totally other haunts the survivor-subject like a ghost, and that the ghost is none 




The notion of haunting alludes to the effect of the other within the self, the other that can never 
be easily colonized by the self. Haunting, as a movement, refutes closure, resolution or the 
complete working though of the mourning process, since it disrupts the agency and control of the 
subject in mastering just what is at stake in the experience of loss. It speaks to an inheritance 
from/of the other, which, as Derrida (1994: 16) suggests, is “never gathered together, it is never 
one with itself”. Instead, one “inherits from a secret” (16) of the ghost of the other who has been 
“carried off by death” (Derrida, 2001a: 58). The secret of the ghost, however, is dissymmetrical 
and it remains incommensurable with absolute knowledge and understanding; it seems 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the subject has with the other. Indeed, as Roffe (2004: 38) points out, “Derrida‟s general claim is...that the self is 
nothing without an other, or others, to which it has a fundamental and fundamentally constituting relationship”. As 
Derrida (2001a: 84) puts it: “The other is in me before me: the ego...implies alterity as its own condition”.  
9
 Bennington (2010: 59) proposes that “a life worthy of its name” would need to be “involved in the economy of 
death” and most especially “‟open‟ (i.e. alive) to the event of the other” and the other‟s death.  
10
 Derrida (2001a: 89) suggests that we are “structured by the phantasmic”, the spectral, so that we have a 
“phantasmic relation to the other” which “cannot be reduced”. The ghost alludes to the “intervention of the other in 
me”, the haunting of the other in the self. The exchange between the other (as spectre) and the self is complex and 
difficult. As Davis (2007: 74) writes: “What seems almost impossible is always to speak of the spectre, to speak to 
the spectre, to speak with it, therefore most of all to make or to let a spirit speak”.  
“inexhaustible, bottomless and infinite” (Davis, 2007: 136)11. It ultimately exceeds “my seeing 
and knowing (mon voir et mon savoir), although it concerns the innermost parts of me, right 
down to my soul, down to the bone, as we say” (Derrida, 1995a: 54). For Derrida, an exchange 
with the ghost seems ethically urgent, yet extremely complex, since the ghost is “a figure of the 
other, of the strange and the stranger, of that which in me is other than myself and that which 
outside me is more than I can know” (Davis, 2007: 76). In this way, the ghost “holds open the 
possibility of an unconditional encounter with otherness” (76), so that, as Derrida (1994: 176) 
contends, we should “learn to live by learning not how to make conversation with the ghost but 
how to talk with him, with her, how to let them speak or how to give them back speech, even if it 
is in oneself, in the other, in the other in oneself”. In short, learning to live is about learning to 
live “otherwise” and more “justly” with the spectres of others (Derrida, 1994: xviii). This “being-
with the other”, this “being-with spectres”, is concerned with the challenge and responsibility of 
living with the other who is not presently living, either to us, in us or outside of us (xviii-xix). 
The subject as survivor is, as Davis (2007: 129) proposes, properly “haunted” and entangled in 
only partially comprehended “dramas of mourning for lost others”, where the surviving subject 
struggles to come to terms with, and relate to, the beloved deceased. The haunted subject, who 
cannot quite bring the process of mourning to an end or work through the process of mourning 
properly, since s/he is not fully in control, is also, to some extent, the melancholic subject in the 
sense that s/he cannot consciously grasp just what has been lost and thus seek resolution. The 
condition of mourning-without-end, an incomplete, suspended or interrupted state of mourning, 
has significant implications for the subject in that it seems to suggest that, for Derrida, the 
mourning subject is always already the melancholic subject. However, Derrida‟s notion of the 
melancholic subject has less to do with incapacity and immobilisation, and more to do with a 
sense of being haunted by, and thus responsible to/for, the dead significant other.  
The notion of responsibility signals the vital interconnectedness of the self with the other, so that 
it becomes impossible to consider the self without considering the other. However, the relation of 
the self to the other is never symmetrical or reciprocal, and the ghost of the other is a 
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 Derrida (1994: 6) suggests that the ghost is “something that one does not know, precisely, and one does not know 
if precisely it is, if it exists, if it responds to a name and corresponds to an essence. One does not know: not out of 
ignorance, but because this non-object, this non-present present, this being-there of an absent or departed one no 
longer belongs to knowledge. At least no longer to that which one thinks one knows by the name of knowledge”.  
“heteronomic figure” who “watches me, concerns me, and concerns or watches me while 
addressing to me, without however answering me” (Derrida, 2002: 120). Wherever there are 
spectres, “we are being watched, we sense or think we are being watched” (122). Yet the gaze of 
the other, which alludes to “another world, another source of phenomenality, another zero degree 
of appearing” (123), sees without being seen; “I can‟t meet the gaze of the other, whereas I am in 
his sight” (121). For Derrida, this relation of heteronomy does not, however, imply that the self is 
not free. Instead, it becomes the very “condition of freedom” – “my freedom springs from the 
condition of this responsibility which is born of heteronomy in the eyes of the other, in the 
other‟s sight” (122). The spectre is an opening of possible infinity, it “looks at me and concerns 
me and asks me to respond or to be responsible” (123). The fact that the other has died in no way 
absolves us of responsibility; “on the contrary, it assigns an infinite responsibility” whereby the 
autonomy of the self is a heteronomy “which has come from the place of the death of the other, 
as death and as other” (132). Davis (2007: 154) very usefully sums up the notion of 
responsibility when he points out that what Derrida wants to avoid in his consideration of dead 
others is killing them again. He seeks “to find in their legacy a potential for renewed exchange”. 
And it is this potential for renewed exchange that broadly encompasses the ambit of 
responsibility to the dead other.  
For Derrida, melancholia, which “subsists in the bond that links self and other” (Davis, 2007: 
146), is no longer conceived of as a pathological condition, but rather, as Bennington (2010: xi-
xii) suggests, as a “kind of ethics of death, whereby the other‟s loss is not lost in the interests of 
the self”. This loss is, in some ways, maintained as loss and therefore the process of mourning, 
which attempts to resolve itself, will remain incomplete. Incomplete mourning, as an interrupted 
teleology, marks “mourning with a kind of impossibility” (xii). If mourning is an attempt to get 
over a loss, then incomplete mourning (which signals melancholic responsibility) is a “kind of 
structural state of not getting over it, and therefore remaining permanently somewhat short of 
recovery, surviving with a „slash-scar, or narcissistic disfiguration‟” (xii). Incomplete mourning 
endeavours to resist a teleological process of which the outcome is “to lose the loss, to turn the 
loss into a profit, to come back to oneself, to show a return, in spite of the other‟s definitive 
departure” (39). In this way, the alterity of the other is neutralised in the interests of the self and 
identity.  
Derrida‟s version of the mourner as surviving and melancholic (with melancholia as an aspect of 
a haunted survival) challenges any simple delineation of the process of mourning, and highlights 
the seemingly infinite complexities of working through loss and grief. His version remains a 
radical statement that profoundly impacts the subject‟s relation to loss in that the subject will 
continue to carry loss throughout the course of his/her existence (rather than losing or getting 
over loss). The carrying of this loss functions as a catalyst for the subject to begin to think about 
his/her responsibility to the other, about the meaning of living - and living especially in the face 
of one‟s own death. In Derrida‟s version of loss, the subject must not get over loss but rather 
make use of loss as a (creative) spur which facilitates the thinking through of one‟s own 
existence in relation to another. It emphasises, as Bennington (2010: 39) points out, that 
incomplete mourning, a type of “melancholia”, seems ethically preferable to mourning “proper”. 
Indeed, Derrida seems to think that “only something that looks more like melancholia, as a kind 
of protest against mourning, a militant melancholia, then gives any „ethical‟ dimension to 
mourning” (Bennington, 2010: 39). As Derrida (2005: 160) proposes: 
According to Freud, mourning consists in carrying the other in the self. There is no 
longer any world, it‟s the end of the world, for the other at his death. And so I welcome in 
me this end of the world, I must carry the other and his world, the world in me: 
introjection, interiorization of remembrance (Erinnerung), and idealization. Melancholy 
welcomes the failure and the pathology of this mourning. But if I must (and this is ethics 
itself) carry the other in me in order to be faithful to him, in order to respect his singular 
alterity, a certain melancholy must still protest against normal mourning. This 
melancholy must never resign itself to idealizing introjection. It must rise up against what 
Freud says of it with such assurance, as if to confirm the norm of normality. The “norm” 
is nothing other than the good conscience of amnesia. It allows us to forget that to keep 
the other within the self, as oneself, is already to forget the other. Forgetting begins there. 
Melancholy is therefore necessary.   
In this passage, melancholia is “ripped away from pathology and transferred to ethics” so that a 
pathological state of being is re-designated as an ethics of carrying the dead other, as the “only 
proper relation to the dead other” (Davis, 2007: 148). Derrida‟s alternative conception of 
melancholia explores “the ethics of living with the dead” (150), of the haunted subject inhabited 
by ghosts of the dead, so that any attempt at resolving mourning, where the other is taken into the 
self and potentially forgotten in order to ease the conscience of the survivor, is no longer 
possible. Whereas “normal” mourning may consign “the other to a second death so that life can 
continue undisturbed”, the ethics of melancholia attempts to ensure that “the dead other-in-the-
self cannot be subsumed into the survivor‟s re-found autonomy” (148). Melancholia thus 
becomes a protest against the amnesia of mourning and an ethical responsibility to the deceased 
other (148).  
The spectre of melancholia, which haunts in the form of incomplete mourning is, as Bennington 
(2010: 40) suggests, an interruption of the teleology of mourning pursuing its course to the end. 
And it is this “radically interruptive structure” that signals a hospitality towards the other in that 
it “respects precisely what makes the other other (and not me)” (40). Incomplete mourning 
signals that mourning is interminable, that it cannot be closed off, terminated, “put to death” 
(137); it is this mourning-without-end or end-less mourning (as a version of melancholia) that 
raises difficult questions about our (ethical) responsibility towards the other, in memory of the 
other - of the other within us. We bear mourning – and melancholia- in “the experience that 
consists in carrying the other in the self” (Derrida, 2005: 159), in carrying the world of the other, 
the “world after the end of the world” (140). The surviving melancholic subject is thus 
responsible for carrying “both the other and his world, the other and the world that have 
disappeared” (140).  
Derrida does not offer the prospect of an easy or simple exchange with the other who has died. 
His version of mourning the other is radical and demanding; it exacts a continual and incessant 
engagement with the other which the self is forced to bear or endure. This endurance may come 
at a considerable cost to the subject who risks being tormented, for “to let the dead speak 
requires a self-probing, multi-layered textuality which both strains to give voice to the dead other 
and remains maximally lucid in the face of the impossibility of the endeavour” (Davis, 2007: 
138). We are caught in the bind of the impossible and it seems as though speaking to the dead 
requires a secret language to which we do not have access. Nevertheless, dead others continue to 
survive in us [“in me outside me” (Derrida, 1995: 321)] to the extent that we preserve them, and 
we need to be sensitive to this preservation in order to ensure that the alterity of the other is not 
compromised. The dead other is not merely a “captive of the surviving self”, who has been 
archived as a “compliant, passive object of memory” (138). Instead, the self becomes responsible 
for creating a dialogue, “the very breathing of the dialogue, of the dialogue in the world or of the 
most interior dialogue” (Derrida, 2005: 140), an exchange with the other, however interrupted 
and dissymmetrical this dialogue may be. Moreover, this dialogue is infinite and interminable. 
For Derrida, the melancholic position most aptly and responsibly attempts to engage with and in 
this seemingly impossible dialogue from which the subject will not be able to disengage him-or 
herself, except perhaps at the cost of not being able to reach the other within the self in any way. 
The subject will not recover from the impact of the other, whether alive or dead, living dead or 
living on as a ghost, and it is this “ineffaceable incision” (Derrida, 2005: 139) or interruption that 
will continue without respite during the course of our existence as a marker of our involvement 

















Chapter Three: Hélène Cixous and the Poetics of Loss: Writing Death into Life 
Cixous (1998: 71), like Derrida, considers how mourning begins long before the actual death of a 
significant other; it “begin(s) on the first day of love”, once we have established an intimate 
rapport with another. Nevertheless, we are never quite prepared when death arrives, however 
prepared we think we might be, and therefore we miss the “unique chance” (71) which the 
moment of the death of a significant other offers to us. We cannot live this moment, “we don‟t 
manage to find ourselves there”, because it is these moments “that make us feel the rigour of our 
limits” (70). As Cixous writes: “In the moment of my father‟s death, I wasn‟t there, I wasn‟t up 
to it, the world was falling apart above my head, an icy fire devoured space; as for me – I was 
below everything, no bigger than a pebble” (70)12. For Cixous, it is the experience of mourning 
that “shows us the door” where we are “dislodged from our interior habitation” (70). The very 
possibility of thinking about death, about our own mortality and that of significant others, is 
deeply troubling and unsettling. Cixous attributes this resistance to the fact that we “inhabit the 
country of the living” and “that which is beyond, outside – we don‟t have the heart to believe” 
(71). As a result, scenes of death and loss, of mourning, scenes which “transport us... to the other 
side of the world”, frequently “come to pass outside of us, where we pass outside ourselves”. We 
don‟t seem to be able to live these scenes but instead we „die‟ them and are greeted by a 
“monumental Silence” (71): 
At the approach, at the evocation of the scene of my loss of you, no matter from how far 
away, when a thought adventures in that direction, everything is extinguished, I „die‟ to 
me, I go away. Rather die than undergo your death. Your death I could not live.  
In Stigmata: Escaping Texts, Cixous (1998: 72) describes her initial, shocked response to her 
mother‟s death which made her feel “immobile without movement”: 
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 This quotation aptly captures Cixous‟ figurative and allusive style, as well as her embrace of the conceptual 
through metaphor and poetic writing. There is an “exquisite extravagance” at the heart of Cixous‟ writing, a 
“carefree poetics of caring and freeing” that her writing embodies in unique and highly particular ways (Prenowitz, 
1997: 248). Derrida (2006: xiv) has spoken of Cixous‟s “desperate love of language, the poetics of her verbal 
inventions, her still unheard-of vocabulary, her inspiration and her punctuation”, while Cixous (2007: 12), 
commenting on Derrida‟s use of language, offers a very accurate description of her own style that is “accelerated, 
pushed to the limits, paroxysmized, overexcited, unloosed, frenzied, caressed, delivered, incanted, charmed, attuned, 
granted, not given, untameable...” 
I was immobilised, everything in me became immobilized, this didn‟t reach, this didn‟t 
reach me, I didn‟t move, I didn‟t go there, I didn‟t think, I remained inert, I didn‟t feel, 
the thing was happening beyond, over there, and beyond in the very depths of me, where, 
like someone who is afraid of feeling a lot of pain doesn‟t move at all, I didn‟t move a 
thought, I didn‟t move my soul, I petrified myself, I knew what was waiting for me, I 
wasn‟t living this time, I didn‟t live it...  
It seems almost impossible to live “in the present the death of a loved one” (71) which is the 
“terrible hour that I cannot live”, the hour “that cannot come to pass, not with me, that comes to 
pass besides me”13. The “hour” (that is, in the immediacy) of the death of a significant other 
seems to construct an “impassable border”14 (an impossible border) which in turn creates an 
“outside in me”, an “outside interior of me”, an “outside-of-me in me”- the “uprooted heart in the 
heart” (72). Indeed, these “unlivable hours” seem to “happen in the foreign me, in the my region 
where I couldn‟t stand being me” (72), in the “strange and foreign regions of the heart...where 
there is no witness at all” (74). The death of a significant other seems to “eliminate us” (71) in 
the present and it seems as though we can only respond to it more fully at a later point in time – 
“elsewhere, far away, into the future” (71). The full import of the death of a significant other 
seems archived for a future date; it seems to defer itself to another time when we still may not be 
able to live it, to respond to it with more presence. Usually, as Cixous (1998: 72) notes, “the 
great griefs come to us disguised, long after, as ghosts, when we believe them far removed, it is 
then they come, slip, unrecognizable, anguishing, in incomprehensible forms, changed into 
vertigo, into chest pains”. The scene of loss at which we could not be present, returns later, 
“indirect, displaced”, “long after the foreign scene of the burial” (72).   
In encountering the moment of death and loss, we “almost always faint away” (Cixous, 1998: 
70), yet it is through the process of mourning, which death and loss initiate, that we are launched 
into “a space-time whose coordinates are all different from those we have always been 
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 Elsewhere, Cixous (1997: 34) suggests that we are “absolutely beside our own time”. This notion seems to imply 
that we are “ahead of ourselves without having lived what is behind us”. We struggle to live the present of an 
experience, we fall away from it owing to its immensity. Cixous (2009: 44) has poignantly described this experience 
as “an inner global collapse”, the “absolute exaltation of an anguish of monstrous dimensions”, and a “monstrous 
excavation of the cellar of the soul”.   
14
 Cixous (1998: 73) writes that “what does not exist manifests violently as the impassable”. The death of the other, 
who no longer exists (physically, materially), creates an “immense wall”, the “impossible”, which is what does not 
exist, between the other on the other side and the self “on this side”. 
accustomed to” (Cixous, 1997: 9). Cixous considers this strange space-time as the “entredeux” 
(9) or the in-between, between a life which is ending and a life which is beginning. The 
entredeux is “a moment in life where you are not entirely living, where you are almost dead. 
Where you are not dead. Where you are not yet in the process of reliving”. It is an event that 
arrives and “evicts us from ourselves” (9), which in turn contributes to a sense of strangeness. 
The entredeux is the “immense landscape of the trans-, of the passage” (52); it leaves in its wake 
instability and uncertainty while potentially instilling in us a more rigorous and tolerant attitude 
that leads to increased openness and that leaves passage, gives way to a passage which may lead 
us to reconsider the terms and experience of living. The entredeux is everything that “makes the 
course of life be interrupted” where “we find ourself in a situation for which we are absolutely 
not prepared” (9). We do not know how to “live” it. Yet, as Cixous reminds us, “we must” (9). 
And it is this necessity or responsibility (of living for life) that broadly encompasses the process 
of mourning for a loss which provides an “occasion to rethink the whole of human experience” 
(Cixous, 1993: 40), because it is as a result of death and loss and “thanks to death that we 
discover the splendour of life. It is death that makes us remember the treasures life contains, with 
all its living misfortunes and its pleasures” (Cixous, 1991: 137). This citation highlights how 
death and loss inspire or encourage an existential grappling through which the terms of one‟s life 
are reconsidered, reflected on and revised. Moreover, the experience of loss may potentially 
allow for a subtler and richer appreciation of both joy and sorrow, as well as demonstrating the 
necessity of sorrow and suffering for the development of the self, for receptivity to the vastness 
of experience and for hospitality (or “openness”) to the other and difference. Indeed, the capacity 
to work through mourning signals the beginning of a passage from anguish and pain into a 
newfound appreciation of the challenges and complexities of existence.  
The entredeux is what opens up a passage from the self to a hospitable consideration of the 
other. It is “to find that one has arrived at the point where the immense foreign territory of the 
other will begin” (Cixous, 1997: 17). However, as Cixous, reminds us, this does not mean that 
we will necessarily discover the immensity, the reach and the richness of the other in his or her 
“infinite foreignness” (17). Instead, the entredeux may allow for a “strange profit” in our 
suffering whereby there is a “whole manoeuvre of the unconscious, of the soul, of the body, that 
makes us come to bear the unbearable” (19). In this manoeuvre, we become the subject rather 
than the victim of our suffering. As Cixous (1997: 19) writes: 
But human beings try to live through the worst sufferings. To make humanity of them. To 
distil them, to understand their lesson. This is what the poets did in the concentration 
camps. And what we do, ourselves, when the pain that strikes us in our personal life 
makes poets of us.  
Cixous (1997: 20) is interested in our inclination “to search out the noble form”, the poetic form, 
in the most painful moments of existence, that is to say, where we “see ourselves from a point of 
view that raises us up at the moment we are debased” (20). The poetic gesture is what transforms 
“other aspects of both the soul and of human life beyond those which are modified by political 
action” (Cixous, 2008: 89)15. In moments which have a “very high index of intensity” (Cixous, 
1997: 12), we are frequently afraid of seeing ourselves suffer because “we see death, we see that 
we are someone else, we do not recognize ourselves...and the fear becomes incalculable” (25). 
Fear may engender a retreat, a flight before a harrowing reality, yet, in fleeing, “it is life that we 
lose. We believe we‟re saving our life, but we lose it. Because all harrowing events are an 
integral part of life” (25). Cixous considers fear as the “principal enemy” of life and she attempts 
to think about existence as a way of making “fear retreat” (26). She does recognise the 
immensity of pain and suffering, the pain of the experience of mourning, which is “stronger than 
everything” (26)16. However, a close encounter with death, when “we have been brushed by 
death”, may allow for the possibility of a “strange feeling”, a jubilation that we are still living, 
that we have survived death (26)
17
. In this way, our true nobility, our true poetry, is an avowal or 
affirmation of life and living so that “even when we are reduced, when we are crushed”, there is 
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For Cixous (2002: 194), the „poetic‟ is not exclusively about writing or making poems. Instead, it entails a creative 
engagement with suffering that transforms pain into a lived enrichment of the individual‟s human status. The poetic 
is an approach that is open to the uniqueness and alterity of experience and the poet is concerned with the question 
of life and death. Elsewhere, Cixous (1991: 114) writes about the poet that one “must have thoroughly rubbed and 
exhausted one‟s eyes in order to get rid of the thousands of scales we start with from making up our eyes” – “I call 
„poet‟ any writing being who sets out on this path, in quest of what I call the second innocence, the one that comes 
after knowing, the one that no longer knows, the one that knows how not to know”.  The poetic is concerned with 
designating something that refuses appellation, a wordless, nameless “starry wandering about which we sense, 
without ever seeing it, the presence of an order other than our own” (Cixous, 1998b: 5). For Cixous, the anguish of 
grief and suffering offers the opportunity for a renewed and revitalised (poetic) sense of existence. As she writes: 
“Behind the pain, sprouts the poem” (7).                                                                                                                
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 In her literary text, Angst, Cixous (1985: 7) captures the brutality and violence of suffering in the following 
description: “The worst is upon me. This is it: the scene of Great Suffering. During this scene the impossible takes 
place: my death attacks me, life panics and splits in two; one life tears at the other which has it by the throat, biting. 
You struggle. The body breaks, the sky shatters, the scene bursts into flames. You fall and the earth is no longer 
there...Outside, frozen. Motionless. Deported. Displaced”.  
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 Elsewhere Cixous (1991: 89) writes about this “pure joy of feeling that I am not the one who is dying”: “Proof of 
life: the feeling that there is death and life and that the axe did not fall on me”.  
a “resource in us” which “makes the poetic genius that is in every human being still resist. Still 
be capable of resisting” (27). This capacity for response is dependent on the approach one adopts 
towards living and whether this approach is a poetic and hospitable reaching out towards, or 
consideration of, the other and the inexplicable otherness in life. In short, this approach in no 
way diminishes the “immensity of pain” (27). Rather, it affirms the immensity of life, that “life is 




Cixous (1997: 32) suggests that we are “haunted by the question of mortality”, which is 
effectively a question about “what it is to be human, this thing that speaks, that thinks, that loves, 
that desires and that one day is extinguished” (32). Being human, for Cixous, is about “not 
depriving oneself of the rest of the universe. It is to be able to echo – a complex but magnificent 
labour – with what constitutes the universe” (32). In this way, being human is about not being 
insular or insulated, but rather about realising that “one is part of a whole that is worth the trip, 
the displacing of all our ideas” (32). Being or becoming “more human” is about becoming “more 
capable of reading the world, more faithful...to what we can create” (30). As Cixous (1997: 33) 
proposes: 
As for that species of vision I often have of our era, seen by someone who could be 
outside of time, who could travel round it and thus sees its limits: it transforms my 
evaluation of the world or the relationship I have with others. I always see myself as that 
ant, that little letter wandering through a book whose end one cannot see. And that ant, 
that little letter does not see the end of the book. But someone who could see the end of 
the book would have a different life. I imagine that someone... 
It is about choosing a means of living (and loving) which either signals the destruction of the 
other or its safety and preservation through an imaginative consideration of the immensity of 
existence. Living is risky as it involves “advancing straight toward the unknown to the point of 
getting lost” (Cixous, 1998b: 35). We risk losing ourselves, but in risking there is the possibility 
for infinite gain, for the gift of the other.  
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As Cixous (1997: 97) writes: “All that has been lived, all that has been thought, including the worst, regains its 
status of production, of action – if we are not in a state of passivity, if we are not rolled under the waves, crushed. So 
it is not so much gaining time; it is being active; being the subject of one‟s life”.  
Cixous (1998: 73) certainly does not eschew the responsibilities that the experience of loss 
brings. Instead, she welcomes the opportunities that it offers because she knows “very well that 
losing teaches us to live”. Cixous desires “to be there when I lose, I don‟t want to lose the loss” 
(73). In her estimation, the worst part of grief is grief “that doesn‟t let itself be suffered”, an 
“absolute, infinite, indolorous suffering”, a “tragic experience of expropriation” through which 
we cannot even suffer our own suffering, “eat the bread of suffering and drink [our] own tears” 
(73). In the face of loss, we are “absolutely alone” and we “don‟t know how to be there” (74). 
However, in spite of this aloneness, we are faced with an ethical urgency not to renounce the 
“remnants of that which is without music and without words” (74). In the “ultimate hours”, we 
are faced with the challenge of “fish(ing) in the space between the lines beyond the heart for 
what must return to the heart, and to make it sound once more” (74). Cixous (1998: 72) is 
interested in the aporetic movement of passing over an impassable border, of going where we 
seemingly cannot go. She views both writing and dreams as fertile avenues that allow us to 
glimpse what is at stake in the process of loss (and thus life and death).  
Writing is what signifies “a hunger for flesh and for tears, our appetite for living, that, at the tip 
of forsaken fingers, makes a pencil grow” (Cixous, 1998: 74). Writing is the place where “we 
wander along invisible streams” and where we seek “to pass from a region of feeling to a region 
of...painting with words what moves us without words” (82); it is the place “where the door 
opens that gives access to the other side” (82). As Cixous (1998: 74) continues:  
Writing is the movement to return to where we haven‟t been “in person” but only in 
wounded flesh, in frightened animal, movement to go farther than far, and also, effort to 
go too far, to where I‟m afraid to go...I write, I extend my hand; without my knowing it, 
this is already a prayer...it is in this modest, all-powerful way that I begin to save what is 
lost. When I write I ask for your hand; with your hand I‟ll go too far and I won‟t be afraid 
anymore of not coming back. Without my knowing it, it is already love. Love is giving 
one‟s hand.  
Love is what “infinites me” (75), it is “where one saves what passes” (76),  it is the finite seeking 
the infinite as a way of “holding on to what surpasses me, of adding to myself a mother or other” 
(75). What Cixous (2008: 26) calls love is a “renunciation of the demands of a self that wants to 
exert power over the other”.  By extending out to the other, through writing, through dreaming, 
there is the possibility of transforming the impassable border into an “incalculable, deep, 
borderless...instant” (Cixous, 1998: 79). By losing someone significant, we are “entirely invaded 
by exile and bordered by solitude” (78-79). Yet, there is the opportunity, through loving the 
other, to transform this state of grief and loss into an affirmation of living. As Cixous (1998: 79) 
writes: “nothing is given except the chance, then everything needs to be wrenched with vital 
strength from death”.  
For Cixous (1991: 6), the experience of loss incites a desire to witness and understand creatively 
the vicissitudes of existence, to “look at life without dying of fear”. She makes use of writing, 
which is a “life factor” (1997: 98), as a creative gesture or an instance of creativity which opens 
up a new space in consciousness and, by doing so, allows for the exploration of infinite 
possibilities. The medium of writing encourages slippages in consciousness which remain open 
to glimpses or eruptions of unconscious energy. For Cixous (1989: 6), writing is a “question of 
living and surviving. Writing follows life like its shadow, extends it, hears it, engraves it. It is a 
question of living to the end without losing sight of life for a minute, which is immense work”. 
Writing becomes an active way of working through the process of loss. Writing thus functions as 
a “small trembling light in the darkness of the path” (6), for Cixous begins to write from the 
experience of loss, reaching towards a consideration of the impact of loss in life, moving from 
the “hell”19 of loss towards the “direction of the hidden day” (7). In this way, “writing always 
means being saved in a certain way” (8), and it shadows or tracks the working through of loss, 
and thus documents or archives the immensity of experience. As Cixous (1989: 4-5) writes: 
I believe that one can only begin to advance along the path of discovery, of discovery of 
writing or of something else, from the point of mourning or in the reparation of 
mourning. In the beginning, the gesture of writing is linked to the experience of 
disappearance, to the feeling of having lost the key to the world, of having thrown it 
away. Having suddenly acquired the precious sense of the rare, the mortal, and having to 
regain, urgently, the entrance, the breath....We have to do the apprenticeship of Mortality.  
Cixous (1997: 56) is interested in how writing takes us further, to the “further-than-myself in 
myself”, which contains the traces of significant others both deceased and living. Writing is that 
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 Cixous (1989: 7) defines „hell‟ as “incomprehension, it is dreadful mystery, and also the demonic or demoniac 
feeling of being nothing, controlling nothing, of being in the unformed, tiny, before the immense”.  
which can give passage to the possibility of the “further” and it is “a way of leaving no space for 
death, of pushing back forgetfulness, of never letting oneself be surprised by the abyss” (Cixous, 
1991: 3). Writing may accompany us in our attempts to cross through fear. As Cixous (1991: 8) 
suggests: “With one hand, suffering, living, putting your finger on pain, loss. But there is the 
other hand: the one that writes”.   
Dying, rather than living, the death of a significant other may function as a creative spur for 
writing which attempts to relive the experience of the death of a loved one in which one had died 
too. Cixous (1993: 7) suggests that to begin writing, which is to say living, “we must have 
death”. She considers the dead as the “doorkeepers who while closing one side „give‟ way to the 
other” (7).  As Cixous (1991: 37) proposes: 
And from this period of death, one retains the greatest fear and the greatest benefit: the 
desire to remain as close as possible to her, death, our most powerful mother, the one 
who gives us the most violent push of desire to cross over, to leap. 
Cixous suggests that what occurs in response to the death of a significant other is “unspeakable” 
(36), for we experience “the greatest, the most repellent suffering” (37). And it is this decisive, 
“absolutely unforgettable” experience that is archived in memory; but it is memory that “doesn‟t 
know, doesn‟t speak, that is only furrowed scarred flesh; painful proof, but of what...” (37). 
Writing attempts to begin addressing this “what” so that life can emerge “crawling from the 
entrails of death” (37)20. It acknowledges death, the hell of loss – it was a “deep pain (that) 
dictated my first letters from hell” (41). Indeed writing is inextricably bound to a sense of having 
lost everything so that it begins “without knowing, without light, without hope” (38). And it is in 
the confusion of loss, when you are “beside yourself”, when you “wander stripped down, 
undefined, at the mercy of the Other”, that your “flesh lets strangeness come through...without 
resistance” (38-39). This movement of being at the mercy of the other, „inundated with 
otherness” (39), begins to tailor or sketch a “body without borders” which is in fact a “garden of 
love”, for “only when you are lost can love find itself in you without losing its way” (39). Love 
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 Further on Cixous (1991: 41) writes: “In the beginning, there can only be dying, the abyss...After that, you don‟t 
know. It‟s life that decides. Its terrible power of invention, which surpasses us. Our life anticipates us. Always ahead 
of you by a height, a desire, the good abyss, the one that suggests to you: „Leap and pass into infinity‟. Write! What? 
Take to the wind, take to writing, form one body with the letters. Live! Risk: those who risk nothing gain nothing, 
risk and you no longer risk anything”.  
is what seeks out an “unlimited space, the place without end that is necessary and favourable to 
it” (39). It is a “space without bounds” that allows us to hear the “cries of the world, the rages 
and the appeals of the peoples, the bodily songs, the music of tortures and the music of ecstasies” 
(41). Writing becomes a “gesture of (this) love”, so that we write through love and love with 
writing (42). Loving and writing thus “unfold only in each other‟s embrace”, so that love “opens 
up the body without which Writing becomes atrophied” (42). In short, the text of writing is “the 
flesh at work in a labour of love” (42). Writing makes use of the body and the body is an 
affirmation of feeling alive, which in turn retrieves the subject from a state of dying.   
Cixous (1993: 10) considers writing as one of the ways of learning how to die; “it‟s learning not 
to be afraid, in other words to live at the extremity of life”. The death of a significant other offers 
the opportunity to begin to engage with the most intense life possible, with the “extremes of 
experience, thought, life” (34), but death is never enough as we have to have “the courage, the 
desire, to approach, to go to the door” (7)21. The death of a significant other may provide “access 
to the other world” (10). It gives us the experience of “the end of the world” (10), so that we can 
begin to think “through death towards the recognition of love” (41). As Cixous (1993: 10) 
proposes: 
We need to lose the world, to lose a world, and to discover that there is more than one 
world and that the world isn‟t what we think it is. Without that, we know nothing about 
the mortality and immortality we carry. We don‟t know we‟re alive as long as we haven‟t 
encountered death...And it is an act of grace.  
Cixous considers grace as “everything loss brings as it takes away” (10), that “in losing we have 
something to gain” (11). Grace is what allows things to change colour so that we can begin to 
“see other scenes” (12); the “hour of grace‟ would perhaps allow us “to say what we have never 
said” (48). It allows us “to learn more about ourselves more closely, in another light” (Cixous, 
1998b: 30).  With the help of writing, we can begin to think about and through the experience of 
the death of a loved one, which is also to think about the fact of our own mortality. In thinking-
writing about death, we no longer forget, which is to say kill, the dead, but we become “the 
guardian, the friend, the regenerator of the dead” (Cixous, 1993: 13). While writing “proceeds by 
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 As Cixous (1991: 89) writes: “It‟s at this moment, in extremis, that we are born and enjoy the strange things that 
can happen during such a dangerous, magnificent, and cruel experience as losing a relative”.  
groping in the dark”, it can become what MacGillivray (1998: xxi) calls an “edge pursuit: a 
pursuit of the edge, practiced on the edge; an edgy pushing at edges in an effort to feel and fall 
over them”. Indeed, the flow and practice of writing is “in search of what constitutes the edge, 
what functions as the irreducible at the edge” (xxi), so that this edgy pursuit (of thinking, of 
writing, of living) may allow for a “magic flux full of silent words flowing from...one life to the 
other” (Cixous, 1998b: 3). Writing is a link which can aid us in living through the darkness and 
“transposing it into words” (Cixous, 1989: 1). When so much is lost, words can become a “magic 
door opening onto the other world” (2); indeed we “enter the country of words” (5).  
For Cixous (1986: 86), “writing is working”, it is “being worked; questioning (in) the between 
(letting oneself be questioned) of same and of other without which nothing lives”. Writing is 
“infinitely charged with a ceaseless exchange of one with another – not knowing one another and 
beginning again only from what is most distant, from self, from other, from the other within” 
(86). Writing is thus, as McQuillan (2002: 47) points out, not a movement or object of 
possession but a process of questioning whose “only condition is its incessant relation to the 
other”. For Cixous, dreaming also opens the door to another world; it gives us “access to this 
other world where the dead and the dying live” (Cixous, 1993: 59). Indeed, dreams allow “what 
is outside of us during the day” to take place “in us during the night” (Cixous, 1998: 72). Dreams 
give us “the marvellous gift of constantly bringing back our dead alive, with the result that at 
night we can talk with our dead” (Cixous, 1993: 12)22. For Cixous, if we cannot be “guests of the 
dead” by dying, then we can be in the “wisest of companies” by dreaming (59). In dreams, we 
can “hope to move closer to everything we can‟t say without dying of fright” (61). Moreover, we 
can traverse the forest and journey through the world “using all the available means of transport” 
(64). In dreams, we travel to “the heart of the country of the unconscious” (65); the unconscious 
functioning as an “inner foreign country, foreign home, country of lost countries” (70). The 
unconscious makes us other to ourselves and dreaming the other within ourselves may 
potentially give access to the other side, allow us to pass over to the other side. Dreaming brings 
us to the “frontier of the forbidden and helps us to trespass it” (71). It is about “going beyond, 
about breaking through the known, the human, and advancing in the direction of the terrifying, of 
our own end...there where the other begins” (71).  
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 Elsewhere, Cixous (2006: 7) considers how the dead return “through night‟s magic corridors”. They “come back 
to us alive, right here and with no blood tax at the border”.  
In Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing, Cixous (1991: 79-80) suggests the following in 
considering the “step” of dreams or the “school of dreams”: 
A dream‟s charm is that you are transported into another world; no, you are not 
transported, you are already in the other world. The scene is that of the other world. 
There is no transition: you wake up in the dream in the other world, on the other side; 
there is no passport, no visa but this extreme familiarity with extreme strangeness...the 
feeling of foreignness is absolutely pure, and this is the best thing for writing.  
Writing is stimulated by the dream which is a “crossing (of) the frontiers to the other world 
without transition” (81). Cixous (2006: 4) even insists that writing is “subject to the mercy and 
grace of dreams as an infant is at the mercy of the breast”. She likens dreams to poems which 
contain “a treasure locked away somewhere” (1991: 88). Writing becomes the search for this 
treasure, with Cixous reminding us that “the treasure is in the searching, not the finding” (81). 
Indeed, the treasure of dreams, the poetry of dreams, becomes “the universe of passage” which 
helps us “to pass to the other side” (97). Writing “on board the dream” is a dream-writing of 
“what we are when we are no longer ourselves” (106). This dream writing is a “prophet of our 
traces, of our ultimate metamorphoses”, of “our surviving” (106), and “it gets its strength and 
body back by stirring up, citing, resuscitating along the paths of dreams” (Cixous, 2009: x). In 
short, the power of dreams fuels the process of writing which attempts to document the 
immensity of suffering and grief; it holds out the hope that we may be able to live through the 
event of losing a world rather than sinking further (dying further) into the abyss of mourning. As 
Cixous (1994: 196) writes:  
Mourning unfurls its storm over the whole country, ourselves in torrents we weep joining 
our afflictions to the world‟s afflictions, deluge is our condition, but it is not our end, 
while it pours off our plumage, inside the dream lights a candle.   
Cixous (2008: 174) defines writing, the “law of writing” as what we “write in the direction of 
that which does not let itself be written”. Nevertheless, we “must try to write”: “What I can write 
is already written, it is no longer of interest. I always head towards the most frightening. This is 
what makes writing thrilling but painful. I write towards what I flee. I dream about it”. We write 
about what exceeds us, which suggests that “there exists inside us a force that is stronger than us. 
And it‟s precisely this which speaks, it‟s this which launches words” (21). This force in us that is 
stronger than us is courage to “write the passage” (Cixous, 1998: 70), in all the difficulty and 
pain of such a gesture. It requires “extraordinary strength of the body of the soul” (70) and the 
realisation that “writing is not arriving; most of the time it‟s not arriving” (Cixous, 1993: 65). 
Nevertheless, getting there, to this foreign and unknown hour, this hour of “our most intimate 
foreignness” (Cixous, 1998: 63) where the passage is still dark, is the “poet‟s dream”; “getting 
there has always been the poem‟s hope” (62). To write, which is to say, to live, the “most 
difficult”, the “border passage”, the “most torturous” is a “dream” – “it doesn‟t obey us. It‟s a 
dream: it‟s a wind. The wind blows at its hour” (82). Nevertheless, we can ready ourselves, we 
can prepare ourselves, through writing that is hospitable to the other (which is to say, poetic 
writing), for catching something of the experience of the dream.    
For Cixous, writing and dreaming (dreaming of writing, writing dreaming, dream-writing) 
function as approaches or ways to potentially relive what could not be lived in the immediate 
experience of the death of a loved one. Cixous writes in a poetic, personal and reflective way of 
her experience of loss, and she has found writing and dreaming useful tools in helping her to 
think through the question of death and death in its interaction with life. Of course, the tools that 
she uses are not necessarily generalisable; they offer one creative response to loss. For Cixous, 
we can dream-think-write through pain, through death, towards life, and dreaming and writing 
(poetically) are ways of coming “close to others precisely where they are most alive, most 
mortal, closest to death” (91); these are “powerfully alive” ways of thinking through the question 
of death (towards life) (168). In effect, these practices seem to side with life, to give life, to play 
with/between life and death, so that there is “progression from fantasy and denial to inscription, 
recreation” (Sellers, 2002: 97). We take a chance, we hold out hope, knowing that “in the end 
death will win” (Cixous, 2009: x). However, Cixous will rewrite the fact and inevitability of our 
mortality by suggesting that “until the end one doesn‟t know who wins” (x). Until the end, we 
remain alive by believing that we “have to live – otherwise [we] have so many reasons not to 
live” (Cixous, 2008: 153). Until the end, “there is something stronger than ourselves that keeps 
us surviving what is unsurviveable” (153).  
Cixous decides not to adopt a melancholic or stoic position when faced with the experience of 
loss. Instead she integrates the experience of loss (that death evokes) into life and embraces 
suffering as a locus of self-transformation and an affirmation of living through loss and 
recognising the value of otherness in/for life. Cixous begins to think through loss by writing 
about it; her writing takes its inspiration from the dream. She acknowledges mortality through 
the imaginative stratagem of staying one step ahead of death, while partially recuperating the 
dead through an aesthetic of unconscious encounter (via the dream) and textual recreation (with 
the help of writing). Dreaming and writing thus manifest as Cixous‟ approach to, or strategies 
for, shaping a response to death. These strategies, however, do not constitute an attempt to 
aestheticise experience in the sense of ameliorating the harshness of loss through exquisite 
poetry and accomplished literary creation, hence seeking to build a buffer against, or deny, the 
brute fact of one‟s own mortality. Instead, they are powerful tools (for some) to bring to light the 
dark, ugly and violent side of existence, the experience of loss, so that  one may begin or 
continue the process of thinking about death, and what death has in store deep within life itself. 
Cixous (2008: 154) suggests that what impels us towards survival is a “faith” or “grace” in which 
we “feel that something has been saved”. This something is “more than yourself”, “the more-
than-myself”, which alludes to the “in-between-us that keeps us open to the other, to otherness” 
(154). In this way, Cixous‟ goal is the creative preservation of an otherness that exceeds the self, 
rather than some construct of “eternal life” (because death will win in the end). This something is 
an affirmation that “the desert can lead to the spring”, that the “air remains”, that “the flood is a 
promise of birth” (Cixous, 1993b: 28). It is “knowing how to pass from anguish to astonishment 
and how to make the incomprehensible a source of wonder” (Cixous, 1989: 7). It means “loving 
the night, no longer dreading it, treating it like a star-flecked day” (7). The exuberant embrace of 
life through the passage of death is, for Cixous, difficult work, “the great work of living” (7), but 
it is necessary work which allows for an exchange with the exhausting and infinite richness of 
existence, so that living may continue in “the first hour of the next world” (Cixous, 1998: 62). As 
Cixous writes (cited in Sellars, 2002: 102-103), meditating on the question of death and 
reflecting on, or contemplating, the “living part of death” or the “mortal part of life”: 
Place your hand on your death, O human, distinguish between the essential and 
insignificant, and from this point on, you will know in which direction life is...Who is 
afraid of dying, is already dying. Sometimes one has to pass through what resembles 
death, the terrifying stripping away of self, the circle of fire, to resume life.     
 
Chapter Four: Conclusion 
In attempting to engage with the aftermath of the loss of a loved one, Derrida and Cixous are 
deeply sensitive to the complexities and responsibilities that this loss evokes or incites. Both 
writers are keenly interested in what death holds in store deep within life itself, before the end. 
They express an urgent and abiding interest in the significance of death for life and in how the 
fact of our own mortality and the experience of the loss of significant others play themselves out 
or affect the course of our existence. The experience of loss is a useful marker in this life-death 
debate because it brings to the fore the scope of our life and the possibility of our death, which is 
to say the question of our existence. The full spectrum of loss incites existential grappling: how 
do I make meaning of my inevitable death and the death of significant others? To put this 
differently,  how do I make meaning of my life in the face of my inevitable death and the death 
of significant others? Through their writing, Derrida and Cixous actively take on these 
compelling questions of existence. For Derrida, the process of mourning is interminable. It 
entails a reckoning with the dead other, who brings to the fore the fact of our own mortality
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 and 
questions of life and living. It is extremely difficult, and potentially treacherous, to internalise the 
other within the self. The other ultimately resists the enclosure of our memory and any 
“successful” mourning which takes the other into the self risks the threat of cannibalising the 
alterity of the other.  
Derrida draws our attention to the intricacy of experience and what we once shared and 
exchanged with the other who has now died. Our encounter with the other, who is now only 
“with us” insofar as he s/he is “in us”, also alludes to experience that may not necessarily be 
readily available to our conscious minds. What we shared with the other was a unique world of 
living which has been brought to an end by death. Derrida is concerned with how we honour, 
most faithfully, most responsibly, this unique and inimitable engagement. Our responsibility 
does not cease as a result of the death of a loved one. Instead we are called upon to respond to, 
and to be responsible for, the end of this unique world. Derrida is interested in the potential for 
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 While the death of a significant other brings to the fore our own sense of mortality, this provocation should not be 
viewed in terms of a reckoning with all deaths in light of our own imagined demise. Rather, the death of another 
makes us aware of our own frailty and finitude, of the fact that at some point we will die. Derrida is acutely and 
painstakingly aware of the difference of the other, that the life of the other is different from mine, that the death of 
the other will be different from mine, that the other is not me.  By remaining rigorously hospitable to the differences 
between the self and the other, Derrida attempts to avoid the risk of a solipsistic consumption of the other.  
renewed exchange with the other, even though the other is now solely for us a spectral absent 
presence that haunts the self. In his focus on renewed exchange, Derrida eschews the process of 
mourning where the self “gets over” the loss of a significant other and returns (perhaps 
somewhat triumphantly, and not without a fair share of forgetting) to a normal state of 
functioning as enjoyed prior to a bereavement. Derrida sides more closely with a melancholic 
position that protests against this type of mourning that attempts to lose the loss. In his version of 
melancholia, the self, who is haunted by the ghost of the other, attempts to carry, and actively 
struggles with carrying, the lost world of the other, the world between-two that has now 
disappeared. Carrying the other, which is to say being responsible for and responsive to the 
spectral other, seems a near impossible task given that the relationship with the other has been 
interrupted (or ruptured) and is now dissymmetrical. However, for Derrida, it remains an ethical 
challenge without end (or which is to be marked only by our own end). Such commitment is 
necessary for keeping the other alive, for keeping the other within the self alive, for carrying the 
other into an active engagement with - or actively considering otherness in - the questions of life, 
death and the permutations of existence. Ultimately, the loss of the other is irrevocable and 
Derrida is aware of a certain irreducibility at the heart of loss, which in turn leads to the spectral 
haunting of the self by the other. Effectively, we can never do what we most want, which is to 
speak directly to the dead other without any barriers. 
Cixous suggests that we are never quite prepared for the moment of the death of a loved one. We 
are taken by surprise, shocked to the core, and we never seem fully present at this event. Indeed, 
we frequently, and out of fear, “die” the death of a significant other; we are unable to live 
through the sheer immensity of the traumatic event or experience. Cixous is interested in finding 
ways to reclaim (for life) what we have lost in the death of another. She views the other‟s death 
as an opportunity for us to live life more creatively, more vitally. Each time, death transports us 
into a strange and new existence that we need to pass through, to live through. Indeed, the loss of 
a loved one gives occasion to start thinking more creatively about our existence, and about what 
we treasure or value most. This consideration is inextricably linked to a responsiveness to, a 
hospitable and loving expansion towards, the horizon of the other. With the aid of writing and 
dreams, we can pass over to the (other) side of life which affirms surviving and living (living-on) 
in the face of, in the aftermath of, death. Writing and dreaming take us further, they cross borders 
to the edge of existence, so that we can begin to learn to live at the extremity of life and engage 
with the most intense life possible
24
. Writing and dreaming hold out the hope that we may begin 
to face death; this in turn affirms the essential and vital embrace of life, and concomitantly the 
immensely creative work of living. While Cixous sides with life, voting “for life”, she does not 
sacrifice death to life or undervalue what is lost in death. She realises that she will die in the end 
– an irrefutable fact of life. However, until her end, she is compelled by the seemingly infinite 
possibilities that life holds; she desires to live life to the fullest through the experiences of death 
in life, such as loss. Cixous is intrigued by the expanse of living on the edge through writing and 
dreaming. Dreaming and writing (writing informed by the dream) become her guides to living 
more richly and vibrantly; they have a distinctly personal resonance for her.  
While one should not attempt to elide the differences in the approaches of Derrida and Cixous to 
mourning and loss, there seem to be points of intersection in their considerations of this theme. 
Indeed, both writers feel an immense responsibility to the other (and to the other within the self) 
who, as a result of death, risks disappearing or being colonised by the self. The loss of a loved 
one is an extremely painful and challenging process and it marks the end of a world formed 
uniquely between one and the other, between one and another. Derrida and Cixous feel a 
responsibility to contend with the aftermath, or fallout, of this lost world, with what it means to 
live in a different world, a world that is strange and unfamiliar. They are interested in creatively 
grappling with what is means to be a self who loses another and who must nevertheless find 
ways of keeping the other alive and hospitably reaching out towards the other with as little 
appropriation as possible.  
Cixous adopts the position of the creative writer-dreamer who crosses over death into a life after 
death, while Derrida assumes the role of the melancholic philosopher who awaits death and, in 
the meantime, must live life affected by the deaths of others whose absence haunts the present. 
For Derrida, philosophy is learning how to die, which is to say how to live, whereas for Cixous it 
is writing (and dreaming) which teach us how to live and die. Having said this, though, one 
cannot exclude the absolute centrality that Derrrida accords to writing and textuality in 
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 Derrida (2006: 114) notes that experience for Cixous is a “performativity of a writing that travels and crosses the 
continental distances at full speed and on all possible rhythms”. For Cixous (1998b: 3), writing involves a 
performance with and through the body; it is a flow of blood through the veins, a “wordless dialogue from blood to 
blood”. 
philosophy; philosophy is indelibly indebted to, and (in)formed by, writing
25
. Instead of 
espousing a melancholic position in relation to life, Cixous prefers an exuberant, poetic, yet 
extremely thoughtful and sensitive, embrace of life; however, this preference in no way creates 
an irreparable divide between her work and Derrida‟s. Instead, it is matter of emphasis or 
orientation, a preference for creating differently, otherwise. In her text, Rootprints, Cixous 
(1997) attempts to delineate the differences between her approach to life and death and Derrida‟s 
mode of understanding. Initially, however, she mentions how they are often both “attracted, 
interested, questioned, moved or disturbed by the same mysteries”, and that she can only (and 
paradoxically) discern differences between them “from out of a sensation of resemblance” (81). 
As Cixous continues: “It‟s as if, coming from very far away, having covered the same path in the 
same direction for millennia, parallel, sometimes moving apart, sometimes coming together, 
there were the trace in us, each one on our own side, of the long path”. In true deconstructive 
style, Cixous recognises a kinship in the differences in orientation between herself and Derrida; 
yet, while difference is acknowledged, there is also a recognition of closeness, intimacy, and 
exchange in difference.  
Cixous (1997: 82) proposes that death is fundamental for both herself and Derrida – “we live, we 
write starting from death”. However, “faced with the anguish” (81), they respond differently. For 
Cixous, death is past, her own death has already taken place (82); she attempts to live through 
the worst, live through the “deaths”, the losses, that rupture existence. By contrast, death awaits 
Derrida - he expects it in the future. While Cixous offers the following comparison, she 
recognises that it is “too clean, too rigid...and undoubtedly the positions exchange themselves” 
(82). As she continues:  
Of course death also has a future for me. But I am not expecting death. I am expecting to 
cross it, to spend it. Him [i.e. Derrida]: death will bring to an end; all of life flows 
towards him from this ultimate term. There is an intense feeling of finitude in him – 
which perhaps either engenders or maintains his infinite racing...Me: life flows towards 
life. Between life and life there is an unknown passage. Him: he fears his own death for 
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 When Cixous (1997: 81) considers Derrida‟s approach to philosophy, she notes that she cannot “separate the man 
from the writing...because he is the-man-who-writes. He steeps his pen in his own blood. He is always in the process 
of writing (even when he is not writing). I ought to say: thinking with words, phrases. Writing is his nature. And that 
writing is an extreme fidelity”.   
others. Me: I fear the death of others. My own death will arrive last. After. That is why I 
cannot not desire it. (But it is living that mobilizes me: living is such work) (82). 
The last line of this quotation (in brackets) elucidates the differences in motivation between 
Derrida and Cixous. Both writers are compelled to lead the most intense life possible, but Cixous 
is motivated to live vitally and creatively by living, by life itself, whereas Derrida is motivated to 
learn to live finally by the fact the he will die, by the need to seize opportunities that will 
disappear with his own death
26
. Cixous feels that we die many times during our lives and she is 
interested in crossing over these mini or quasi-deaths, through the passage, into a life after death, 
into a renewed and reinvigorated sense of existence. Derrida, on the other hand, awaits his own 
death, as a grand event in the future, and it is this awaiting that incites his “infinite racing”, his 
desire to live intensely before his own death arrives.  
In his text on Cixous, H.C. for Life, That is to Say...,  Derrida (2006: xiii) explains that Cixous 
has taken sides with life, for life, for living life. He suggests that in this siding with life she 
wagers her life on life as an act of faith, “beyond a death whose test and threat are none the less 
endured”. Cixous “orients herself in relation to life, as one says to orient oneself with a compass 
or by the sun” (36). While Cixous never denies death - indeed she “knows and understands (it) as 
well as anyone” - she prefers “to turn everything and make it come round to the side of life” 
(36); she “mounts life...as one mounts a play” (37). For Cixous, death acts as a catalyst for living 
life most productively and fully. She replaces a life before death with a life after death, through 
which a death in life (initially experienced as loss) leads to the possibility of a renewed sense of 
living. Being „for life” is “nothing else than a living of death...still living death, living it for 
oneself, for the other, and for life” (89). Being for life is “life in exchange for death” (129); it is 
bringing to life or creating in the world.  
In a dialogue between Cixous and Derrida (interestingly entitled, “From the Word to/of Life”) 
Derrida makes mention of some of the themes he explored in H.C. for Life, especially the 
“affirmative thought of life” in Cixous‟ writing and her “faithful and unfailing friendship”, 
forever, for life (2006b: 7). “For life” is an “affirmation, a taking sides with life”, which, Derrida 
                                                          
26
 In her fictional text, Hyperdream, Cixous (2009: 89) reports that her friend, J.D., was always having to call her 
back and remind her of death: “In the end I‟m always having to remind you that on my side we die too fast, while 
you on your side live too fast”.  
adds, “I have never been able to share” (7). He continues: “I am not „against life‟, but neither am 
I „for life‟ like her” (7). Cixous responds to this statement rather playfully and enigmatically with 
the following counterstatement: “You are against death and fiercely for life. But otherwise. 
Dis/quietedly” (7). What can we make of Cixous‟s counterstatement? Is her retort an absolute 
contradiction of Derrida‟s statement or is it a qualification as a means of continuing (living-on) 
with the dialogue? In her essay, “The Flying Manuscript” (an essay which now forms a central 
part of the monograph, Insister of Jacques Derrida, which is Cixous‟ response to Derrida‟s text 
about her), Prenowitz (2006: xv) notes that Cixous offers an “extremely poetical and moving 
meditation-dialogue, an unprecedented act of resistance to the work of mourning”. Cixous (2007: 
60) argues with Derrida, still, even after his death, and insists (as the title of her monograph 
indicates) that he is on the side of life: “But you think living you think of living, to live is that, I 
say...you hold on to life like no one else”. It seems as if this dialogue continues, will continue 
into the future, and any easy resolution of the question of sides for life and death remains at 
present impossible.    
While it falls beyond the scope of this project to offer a sustained and searching analysis of the 
life-death dialogues between Derrida and Cixous, it seems important, however briefly, to give 
the reader a taste of what is at stake in the questions of life and death. Although these questions 
cannot be ignored or foreclosed, their ultimate meanings (if such are conceivable) are deferred to 
a future time that is currently beyond the enclosure of knowledge. Cixous (1997: 82) rightly 
points out just how central these questions are to both her and Derrida in their writings: “These 
„readings‟ of death, of life, of survival, or afterlife, of time, of love, of the other, would lead me 
to unroll all the parchment of our works”. The process of loss is an experiencing of the secret, 
not a hidden, intimate secret that can be revealed, but rather, as Derrida has suggested (2001: 38), 
a “certain inimitable and unique way of doing things”. Such a way alludes to an honouring of the 
lost world that was shared with another, which in turn allows the other within the self to be 
recognised. In experiencing loss, we are called upon to grapple actively and responsibly with the 
death of the other, and more challengingly, we are asked to respect the probability that we may 
not grasp the full significance of this loss. This requires immense hospitality which is, according 
to Cixous (2008: 175), an “absolute yes to the other...you take on something of which you cannot 
measure the development, the effects, the destiny. You cannot do otherwise”. It is perhaps the 
French writer, Maurice Blanchot (1997: 291), who most aptly sums up this demanding 
responsibility or hospitality to the (dead) other: 
 We must give up trying to know those to whom we are linked by something essential; by 
this I mean we must greet them in the relation with the unknown in which they greet us as 
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